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Applying International Environmental Legal
Norms to Cyber Statecraft
JASON HEALEY AND HANNAH PITTS*
I. INTRODUCTIONT
As globalization intensifies, technology creates new opportunities
and challenges for states, industry, and individuals. Cyberspace is a
telling example of this phenomenon; it has changed the lives of
billions of people and has increased connectivity and efficiency, but
cyberspace has also made individuals and governments more
vulnerable to security threats, theft, and other methods of attack. Even
as cyberspace has interconnected governments and people, cyber
attacks can create national security threats against states and private
critical infrastructure, a phenomenon that implicates the roles and
responsibilities established in international policy and international
law.
While international law has been successful in creating regimes to
govern other aspects of interstate relations and international security,
its application to cyber policy is relatively nascent. Policymakers and
theorists have posited a variety of existing policy and legal frameworks
to apply to the issues of cyberspace. States thus far have largely chosen
to address these challenges through three approaches: technical,
crime, and warfare. Each of these traditional approaches has helped,
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though none-singularly or collectively-has gotten the upper hand
against the challenges of cyber threats.
Accordingly, it is time to look to newer approaches, such as
borrowing from public health or irregular warfare. This paper will
briefly review these other approaches, but focus on another often
overlooked, but potentially beneficial, framework-that of applying
international environmental law to the security challenges of
cyberspace. This framework cannot replace those of the traditional
models; that is, it will not invent more secure technologies, defeat
cyber criminals, or help militaries understand the laws of armed
conflict in cyberspace. However, applying environmental legal norms
to cyberspace could be useful because much of international
environmental law addresses a problem familiar to cyber
policymakers, the inherent tension between a state's sovereignty and
its obligations to individuals, other states, and a shared common
space. As nations analyze their environmental rights and
responsibilities under international law, they will find many concepts
helpfully applicable to cyberspace as well.
II. APPROACHES FOR INTERNATIONAL CYBER SECURITY,
CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION
To address cyber challenges, nation-states have tended, whether
formally or informally, to use a mix of three approaches-the
Technical Approach, Criminal Approach, and Warfare Approach.'
Each is good at solving a range of problems, though each has also been
unsuccessfully tried outside of that range.
Practitioners of the Technical Approach see each problem as a
technical challenge to be overcome; if cyberspace is unsecured and is a
hotbed of crime, we should invent new devices, standards, or
methods, and respond quickly and effectively to disruptive cyber
incidents. These engineers, entrepreneurs, scientists, and
programmers2 have, of course, been wildly successful at building and
1 See Gregory J. Rattray & Jason Healey, Ctr. for a New Am. Sec., Non-State Actors and
Cyber Conflict, in 2 AMERICA'S CYBER FUTURE: SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 65 (Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp eds., 2011), for a deeper discussion
of these approaches. The forthcoming work from the Cyber Conflict Studies Association
also addresses these approaches and compares them with alternative models. More
information about the work is available at ww.cyberconflict.org.
2 Key organizations that provide invaluable service to the Internet community include the
Internet Engineering Task Force, International Center for Assigned Names and Numbers,
The Internet Society, North American Network Operators Group, Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams, and many more.
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expanding cyberspace and providing us ever more amazing
capabilities, but they have not yet been able to give the defense in
cyberspace any edge over hackers, organized crime, and other
attackers.
The Criminal Approach entails formal legal regimes and strong,
widely understood domestic and international norms for reducing
crime and bringing criminals to justice. At the international level,
nations share long-standing traditions by which they cooperate
toward these ends. Despite these frameworks, it remains very difficult
to solve cyber crimes due to a variety of problems including
jurisdictional complexity; a lack of trained police, prosecutors, and
judges; and problems with digital forensics and evidence.3
The Warfare Approach seeks to develop and apply military
doctrine for threat deterrence and response. The idea has been
problematic, given that few, if any, of the malicious incidents
popularly called "cyber warfare" live up to such a label. A wide range
of crimes, from patriot hacking4 to WikiLeaks hacktivists,5 have
improperly been called "war," as has Chinese espionage. 6 Yet, national
defense establishments continue to develop both offensive and
defensive cyber capabilities7 and there are several efforts to apply
existing international law governing military matters, such as from the
United Nations Charter and Geneva Conventions.8
3 One group investigating cyber-crime found that "living in St. Petersburg, Russia, the
Koobface gang might as well be living on Mars, so poorly developed are the mechanisms of
international law enforcement cooperation." NART VILLENEUVE, INFORMATION WARFARE
MONITOR, KOOBFACE: INSIDE A CRIMEWARE NETWORK 11 (2010), available at
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/reports/iwm-koobface.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Ellen Messmer, Kosovo Cyberwar Intensifies Chinese Hackers Targeting U.S.
Sites, Government Says, CNN, May 12, 1999, http://articles.cnn.com/1999-o5-
12/tech/9905_12_cyberwar.idg-lhackers-web-servers-web-sites? s=PM:TECH.
5 Michael Evans & Giles Whittell, Cyberwar Declared as China Hunts for the West's
Intelligence Secrets, THE TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech-and web/article7o53254.ece.
6 id.
7 Most notably the stand-up of U.S. Cyber Command in 2010, but other countries are also
developing such capabilities, including United Kingdom, China, Germany, and France.
8 See, e.g., THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT (2000); David E.
Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 87 (2010);
Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International
Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121 (2009); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the
Use ofForce in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM.
358 [Vol. 8:2
HEALEY & PYITS
Each of these approaches has significant advantages and their
proponents are correct to drive towards new solutions. Yet twenty
years of pursuing such solutions has not yet definitively changed the
landscape and cyber threats are as worrisome as ever. Accordingly, it
is time to look for other approaches. Three possible new approaches
are to use perspectives from irregular warfare, public health, and
environmental law. The first two have been introduced in other
papers, 9 so this work will focus on the last, namely, how
environmental laws can help address problems in cyberspace.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLICABLE TO TRADITIONAL
CYBER SECURITY APPROACHES
To frame the discussion of the applicability of international
environmental law to cyberspace, this paper will first examine the
international legal constructs behind the three traditional approaches
mentioned above, Technical, Criminal, and Warfare.
There is, strictly speaking, little or no international "law" that
governs the Technical Approach. To the extent the Technical
Approach is shaped by global norms, they emanate from a system of
governance comprising a set of multi-stakeholder organizations,
including the Internet Society (ISOC), Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). While these
forms of governance are foundational to the operation of cyberspace,
they do not represent a comprehensive approach to securing
cyberspace and influencing behavior in cyberspace.
These multi-stakeholder organizations reflect the initial ethos of
the Internet pioneers and are sufficient for their current tasks.
However, these forms of information international governance are
unlikely to address the most pressing cyber security threats in
isolation. They are crucial to the operation of cyberspace and any
J.TRANSNAT'L L. 885 (1999); and Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network
Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 365 (2002). Additionally, the EastWest
Institute has been pursuing this line of dialogue with a panel of United States and Russian
experts, most notably KARL FREDERICK RAUSCHER & ANDREY KOROTKOV, EASTWEST INST.,
WORKING TOWARDS RULES FOR GOVERNING CYBER CONFLICT: RENDERING THE GENEVA AND
HAGUE CONVENTIONS IN CYBERSPACE (Jan. 2011) and EASTWEST INST., RUSSIA-U.S.
BILATERAL ON CYBERSECURITY: CRITICAL TERMINOLOGY FOUNDATIONS (Karl Frederick
Rauscher & Valery Yaschenko eds., Apr. 2011).
9 Rattray & Healey, supra note 1, at 68; see also the forthcoming monograph from Cyber
Conflict Studies Association.
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viable solutions must include these organizations, but more must be
done. The multi-stakeholder organizations may be able to harden the
underlying architecture or make more robust the technical
framework, but these organizations cannot provide a comprehensive
solution alone.
Under the Criminal Approach, international norms for cyber crime
are relatively advanced, as this has been a focus of many governments,
especially the United States. The U.S. focus on international norms to
combat cyber crime can be clearly seen in two recent U.S. strategies,
as well as its continued and strident support of the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime. The International Strategy for
Cyberspace establishes as an existing international norm: "States
must identify and prosecute cybercriminals, to ensure laws and
practices deny criminals safe havens, and cooperate with international
criminal investigations in a timely manner."1o The more recent
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime also views
international legal and policy coordination as crucial to addressing
cyber-crime: "Internationally, [the United States] will further
international norms against tolerating or sponsoring crime in all its
forms, including in cyberspace."11 These strategies combined with U.S.
action in organizations like Interpol and the Financial Action Task
Force, demonstrate current international norms about cyber crime.
International organizations and documents have also reflected
these norms. For example, "[t]he [United Nations] General Assembly
has called upon states . . . to prevent their territories from being used
as safe havens . . . . [and] cooperate in the investigation and
prosecution of international cyber attacks." 12 The landmark cyber
crime treaty, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, also
10 THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY,
AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 10 (May 2011), available at
http://ww w.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss viewer/international strategy for cy
berspace.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE]. The same strategy
commits the United States to participate in "international cybercrime policy development,"
"harmonize cybercrime laws internationally," "focus cybercrime laws on combating illegal
activities, not restricting access to the Internet," and denying "terrorists and other
criminals the ability to exploit the Internet for operational planning, financing, or attacks."
Id. at 19-20.
11 THE WHITE HOUSE, STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME:
ADDRESSING CONVERGING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 14 (July 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/2011-strategy-combat-
transnational-organized-crime.pdf.
12 Graham, supra note 8, at 94.
360o [Vol. 8:2
HEALEY & PYITS
known as the Budapest Convention, expansively covers "any crimes
for which it is necessary to collect evidence 'in electronic form."'13 The
convention not only commits national governments to make illegal a
range of cyber crimes (such as illegal access, interception, data or
system interference, computer forgery and fraud, and child
pornography),14 but also mandates signatories to enact new
procedural provisions, such as on extradition and mutual assistance.15
Despite the development of the treaty in the Council of Europe, the
U.S. was crucial in its creationl 6 and has made the accession of non-
European countries to the Convention a priority. 17
However, the Convention has two main drawbacks. Over thirty
nations have both signed and ratified the Convention, but worldwide
adoption is unlikely as many nations see it as a specifically "European"
document.18 Moreover, according to Robert Knake, "Though the
convention has helped develop an international standard for
13 See Michael Vatis' excellent explanation of the treaty and its implications, The Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING
CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 207,
208 (2010).
14Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, art. 2, NOV. 23, 2001, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/185.htm.
15 Id. at titles. 2, 3.
16 See Vatis, supra note 13, for a discussion of U.S. actions and interests in the creation of
this document.
17 For example, the International Strategy for Cyberspace included a commitment to
"harmonize cybercrime laws internationally by expanding accession to the Budapest
Convention." INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 10, at 20. Further,
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime provides countries with a
model for drafting and updating their current laws .. .. The United
States will continue to encourage other countries to become parties to
the Convention and will help current non-parties use the Convention as
a basis for their own laws, easing bilateral cooperation in the short
term, and preparing them for the possibility of accession to the
Convention in the long term.
Id.
i8 ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF
CYBER INSECURITY 17 (2010). This feeling persists as only a small number of non-European
countries (including the United States, Canada, Japan, and South Africa) have signed the
Convention.
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criminalizing cyber crime, it has not led to an appreciable reduction in
cyber crime." Indeed, "Members of the convention include some of the
worst cyber-criminal havens in eastern Europe . . . ."19 This contrasts
sharply with the current U.S. push for expanded accession to the
Convention. These problems are also compounded by the practical
difficulties of prosecuting cyber-crime, which is often resource-
intensive and technically challenging to obtain the evidence needed
for convictions.
Lastly, the Warfare Approach presents two key questions at the
focus of current legal debate: whether a cyber attack could constitute a
use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and whether a cyber
attack could cross the second threshold of an "armed attack" under
Article 51, which recognizes the inherent right to collective and
individual self-defense.20 Answering these questions is made difficult
by the lack of a definition for "use of force" or "armed attack," but
these are not new issues and they have been previously addressed in
the "kinetic" context. The right to resort to force, also known as jus ad
bellum, is articulated in Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Many U.S. legal scholars and practitioners have concluded that for a
cyber attack to be considered an armed attack it must have the same
scope, duration, and intensity of a kinetic attack, using the traditional
framework of Jean Pictet in the commentaries to the Geneva
Convention.21 That is, the effects of a cyber attack must be the same or
comparable to what would be an armed attack using conventional
force. The real debate, therefore, will depend on the facts of any
particular attack and whether it is legally and politically accepted as
an armed attack. If it is, then the victim state retains the same rights
under Article 51 as in any armed attack context.
19 Id.
20 "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
See Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as International
Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 825 (2001); Schmitt, supra
note 8.
21 For a discussion of the Pictet factors and other issues of laws of armed conflict, see
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REv. 1 (2009). Jean Pictet, Vice President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, was an international humanitarian law expert, the main
author of the commentary of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and a collaborator on
the commentary for the Additional Protocols of 1977.
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The second aspect of the laws of armed conflict must be briefly
noted as well. Jus in bello principles govern uses of force whether in
an armed conflict or any other context.22 Four main principles guide
jus in bello: military necessity, distinction or discrimination,
proportionality, and humanity.23 While these elements of jus in bello
are elements of customary international law, the norms are also
codified in the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.24 It then follows that if a state chooses to use a cyber
attack in self-defense, it must comport with both jus ad bellum andjus
in bello principles. The application of the laws of war dictate that any
use of cyber force must fall within the parameters of these principles
and that states have the same rights and responsibilities as they have
in a kinetic conflict scenario.
The applicability and scope of applicability of the laws of armed
conflict may still be debated in academic circles, but the United States
has stated in multiple contexts its intentions in responding to
significant cyber attacks. Most plainly, Deputy Secretary of Defense
William J. Lynn stated in a speech unveiling the Department of
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, "[T]he United States
reserves the right, under the laws of armed conflict, to respond to
serious cyber attacks with a proportional and justified military
response at the time and place of our choosing."25 In its International
22 For example, self-defense in response to an armed attack, while not necessarily part of
an armed conflict, must comport with all laws of war, including jus in bello principles. See
common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art.
2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
23 Graham, supra note 8, at 98. For an in-depth exploration of this issue, see also NAT'L
ACAD. OF SCI., TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND
USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
24 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
25 William J. Lynn, III, U.S. Deputy Sec'y of Def., Remarks on the Department of Defense
Cyber Strategy 10 (July 14, 2011), available at
http://ww w.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593. In addition, the
Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace reiterates, "The Department
will work with interagency and international partners to ... reserve the right to defend
these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate." U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT
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Strategy for Cyberspace, the United States stated in equally
unequivocal terms:
All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and
we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted
through cyberspace could compel actions under the
commitments we have with our military treaty
partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary
means-diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic-as appropriate and consistent with
applicable international law, in order to defend our
Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.26
The United States, arguably the leader in many respects of
international cyberspace policy, has demonstrated its commitment to
operating within the laws of war when addressing cyber threats.
Basics of Environmental Norms and Cyber
1. ILC on State Responsibility: States could be held responsible
for cyber activities through action or omission that are
attributable to them and are a breach of an international
obligation
2. Good Neighborliness: States might have an obligation to limit
activities adversely affecting the territory or interests of other
states through cyberspace
3. Trail Smelter Decision: States can be liable for harm from
cross-border emissions, which might include botnet attacks
4. Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration: States have sovereign
use of their own resources, but a responsibility to not cause
damage outside that jurisdiction, which might apply to
cyberspace
5. Corfu Channel Decision: When states are aware of activities
that will harm other states, they are obliged to prevent them,
which could apply to botnets and other malicious attacks
OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 10 (July 2011), available at
http://ww w.defense.gov/news/d2011O714cyber.pdf.
26 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supru note lo, at 14.
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The three approaches discussed above and the relevant
international law, norms, and regimes have their benefits and
drawbacks, as discussed above. However, they have proven, both in
isolation and in concert, to be insufficient to meet the challenges of
cyberspace. Accordingly, we should pursue alternative models for
viewing cyberspace and its problems. Cyberspace and its challenges
are not entirely new and we should therefore not reinvent the wheel.
In fact, we may be able to apply the lessons and principles of other
regimes and frameworks to combat the threats in cyberspace.
A. BASICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS AND CYBER
Public international law is dedicated in part to navigating the
pervasive tension between the principle of state sovereignty and the
scope of mutual obligations among states. In the development of
international environmental law, that tension has been significantly
addressed through the articulation of limited state liability for certain
acts that originate within the territory of one state that cause harm to
another state or to its citizens. For this reason, international
environmental law offers rich possibilities for principles to help
resolve the tension between sovereignty and mutual obligation in
cyberspace, as noted in the text box. International environmental
principles may provide significant help to delineate state
responsibility for state and non-state actions.
Additionally, by viewing cyberspace as an ecosystem and applying
international environmental concepts, this approach avoids some of
the most sensationalized language and perspectives on cyber conflict
and cyber security, allowing for more progress in developing norms
and rules around cyberspace. Security and freedom (or privacy) are
often reduced to a black-and-white, zero-sum discussion about two
competing public goods. A new approach that shifts the debate with
new language and a new paradigm might make it easier to find new
consensus.
When investigating the role of environmental law for cyberspace,
it is vitally important to distinguish between cyber security directed at
stopping or mitigating malicious activity (such as stealing online
personal information or disrupting websites) and government efforts
to control information and content, which are priorities for nations
like Russia and China.27 State responsibility for policing international
27 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 074 CDS 11 E - Information and National Security,
Draft General Report by Lord Jopling, General Rapporteur, 59 (2011). For a discussion of
the respective Chinese and Russian perspectives on cyber security and information
security, see also Christopher A. Ford, The Trouble with Cyber Arms Control, 29 NEw
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content clearly conflicts with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers."28 However, there is far
more leeway to use environmental norms for national responsibility
without compromising Article 19. Accordingly, this latter meaning, to
fight incorrect or unpleasant information content, is not a focus of this
article, which instead looks at activities like botnets, patriotic hacking,
and malicious activities even rising to the level of Stuxnet worm.
Other than cooperating to hunt down cyber criminals, there has
been little international action to control the transboundary flow of
malicious activities. As with the classic tragedy of the commons, there
is a flawed policy that "favors pollution,"29 which considers malicious
activity to be someone else's problem, favoring inaction and allowing
the malicious activity to continue. The environmental model is
particularly strong at addressing these kinds of problems, where a
general "dirtiness" of the environment passively allows cross-border
''emissions.'
In this case, the emissions are not tied directly to any specific
attack, but can be treated as a general problem of pollution. For
example, the United States, although the nation most targeted by
denial of service attacks, is also the top country of origin for global
attacks, accounting for 22% of the total.3o Major telecommunication
providers feel little pressure not to pass "polluted" cyber attack traffic
downstream; according to a survey by Arbor Networks, 27% Of
network operators do not attempt to detect outbound or cross-bound
attacks and, of those who do, nearly half take no actions to mitigate
ATLANTIS 52 (2010). The Russian and Chinese position is perhaps most clearly made in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization's delineation of "Major International Information
Security Threats," including, "[d]issemination of information harmful to the socio-political
and socio-economic systems, spiritual, moral and cultural environment of other States."
See Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement Between the Governments of the
Member States of the SCO in the Field of International information Security, art. 2 (2008).
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/81o
(Dec. lo, 1948).
29 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (Dec. 13, 1968),
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/162/3859/1243.
30 SYMANTEC CORP., INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT VOLUME 16 (2011).
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such attacks.31 Internet Service Providers then could be seen as
originating or passing along pollution by not cracking down on
botnets (computers compromised and under automated control of
hackers) in their networks and not filtering the attacks out of their
traffic flow. Nations could be seen collectively as passively allowing
the ISPs to pass along this pollution by not having sufficiently strong
laws or regulations.
Another kind of activity that might be governed by the norms and
principles of international environmental law are specific large-scale
attacks, rather than the general high-level of pollution mentioned
above. Here, a nation has a far more active responsibility for the
attacks coming from its citizens or from within its borders.
The best example of this kind of attack is the cyber disruptions in
Estonia in 2007.32 Following the removal of a statue in Tallinn
dedicated to the Soviet victory in April 2007, protests by mostly
ethnic-Russians against the removal of the statue turned violent and
began to spill over to cyberspace. On April 27, Estonian news websites
and government websites were defaced and hit by coordinated
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. The attacks then
expanded to multiple waves of malicious activity aimed at different
sectors of Estonian government and society. Because of the high level
of connectivity and prevalence of e-commerce and e-government
services, the DDoS attacks affected many sectors of Estonian society,
including government ministries, most news organizations, banks,
and communications firms.33 While some in Nashi, a Russian youth
political organization aligned with the ruling party in Russia, claimed
responsibility, it is still not clear which individuals were responsible or
the level of involvement of the Russian state. What is clear is the
nationalist and political motivations behind the cyber attacks.
Though Technical, Criminal, and Warfare Approaches may be
helpful in this case, it is possible the norms of environmental law
31 ARBOR NETWORKS, WORLDWIDE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY REPORT VOLUME VI 15-16
(2010).
32 For a comprehensive discussion of the Estonian case, see ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., NATO
COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE (2010). According to the Defense Minister at the
time, "This was the first time that a botnet threatened the national security of an entire
nation." Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED,
Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-o9/ff estonia.
33 Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, THE
GUARDIAN, May 17, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.
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would provide additional avenues of pressure on Russia to prevent
future attacks. Moreover, according to the Estonian government, there
was attack traffic coming from 178 different countries, all of which
may have had some responsibility to limit the hazardous cyber-
"emissions" from their respective networks (as discussed in the
previous example).34
This kind of "transboundary harm," seemingly originating in part
from Russia, flooded Estonian networks and significantly
compromised Estonian governmental and financial services for weeks.
The kind of activity seen in Estonia, below the threshold of the laws of
armed conflict, but sufficiently disruptive to an entire country, is
potentially the most relevant for these environmental norms.
B. NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
This section evaluates the potential application of norms about
state responsibility for non-state actors and for transboundary harm,
focusing primarily on those norms that developed as part of
international environmental law. Some of these norms are not
explicitly environmental in scope, but instead build a case that a
nation can be held responsible for malicious cyber actions coming
from within their national boundaries. As these have already been
applied in environmental contexts, they illuminate the possible paths.
The section first discusses the contours of the International Law
Commission's work on state responsibility before discussing
environmental principles in particular. We then turn to the principle
of good neighborliness, the Corfu Channel case, and the Trail Smelter
arbitration, ending with Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.
The scope, enforceability, remedy, and potential cyberspace
equivalent of these norms and principles are discussed in turn.
1. THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
In 2001, after many decades of work and revision, the
International Law Commission (ILC) finally adopted its Draft Articles
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(ILC Draft Articles). While not binding international law, the work of
the International Law Commission is important for the future of
international law as "private codification," furthering the development
34 Tikk, et al., supra note 32.
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of international law.35 Further, in December 2001, the United Nations
General Assembly recognized the ILC Draft Articles "without
prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate
action."36 The ILC Draft Articles mostly consider the responsibility of
states for state action and do not clarify primary obligations of states.
That is, the ILC Draft Articles as established do not seek to list all
primary obligations, which includes, among other rules, "the asserted
international standard of treatment and the right of diplomatic
protection."37 Instead of listing all possible violations of primary
obligations, the document addresses the secondary obligations out of
those violations. Although the ILC Draft Articles would pertain most
directly to state action in cyberspace, they could have an important
indirect impact on the actions of non-state actors as well.
Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles states, "Every internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State."38 As elaborated in the Commentary for the Draft Articles,
"Whether there has been an internationally wrongful act depends,
first, on the requirements of the obligation which is said to have been
breached, and secondly on the framework conditions for such an act..
. ."39 The ILC Draft Articles, therefore, do not address what would
constitute a primary obligation of a state, nor do they define in detail
how to remedy the breach. That is, the ILC Draft Articles elucidate the
35 Introduction: Origin and Background of the Development and Codification of
International Law, INT'L LAW COMM'N, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2012). Experts on the ILC are elected by the United Nations General Assembly and
then research international legal questions requested by the General Assembly,
governments, or outside organizations. See Statute of the International Law Commission,
G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947), amended by G.A. Res. 485 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950); G.A. Res.
984 (X) (Dec. 3,1955); G.A. Res. 985 (X) (Dec. 3, 1955); and G.A. Res. 36/39 (Nov. 18,
1981).
36 G.A. Res. 56/83, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
37 Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC's State Responsibility Articles:
Introduction and Overview, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 776 (2002) (citing CLYDE EAGLETON,
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928)).
38 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/1o (2001); Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for International Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 1, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l
Law Comm'n, 20, 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001 /Add. 1 (Part 2), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts].
39 Id. art. 1, cmt. 1, at 32.
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secondary obligations when a breach has occurred, but do not address
what actions would constitute a breach.
An internationally wrongful act of a state can be an action or
omission that, "(a) is attributable to the State under international law;
and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State."4o Therefore, "it is not necessary that a state intentionally or
maliciously violat[e] an international obligation to attribute
responsibility."41 A violation could conceivably encompass a state
passively allowing certain activities. The scope of state responsibility
thus depends on the legality of the action in question, not necessarily
the degree of the harm inflicted. For example, in international
environmental law, if a certain kind of pollution has severe
consequences, but does not constitute a violation of a primary
obligation, the state cannot be held responsible.42 This is a significant
limitation, especially when one considers extending the discussed
principles to cyberspace.
The scope of the ILC Draft Articles is generally limited to state
actions, thus falling in the traditional conception of state-dominated
international politics and security. It is important to note that the ILC
Draft Articles were adopted shortly before the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the aftermath of which has affected the
perspective of how relationships between state and non-state actors
are viewed.43 Still, while the ILC Draft Articles do not fully address the
issue of non-state actors, some articles do bear relevance on the issue.
Generally, it is considered that "the only conduct attributed to the
State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or
of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of
those organs . . . ."44 The ILC Draft Articles go on to enumerate what
40 Id. art. 2, at 34.
41Alexandre Kiss, State Responsibility and Liability for Nuclear Damage, 35 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 67, 78 (2008).
42 One alternative is to create Draft Articles on "International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law." See, e.g., ELLI
LOuKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS, EFFECTIVENESS, AND WORLD
ORDER 468 (2006).
43 For a fuller discussion of state responsibility for non-state actors after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2011 and U.S. justifications for military force in Afghanistan
against the Taliban regime, see Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts ofPrivate
Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 83 (2003).
44 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note
38, ch. II, cmt. 2, at 39.
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organs should be considered those of the state and under which
circumstances.45
Article 8 is the most relevant article with regard to non-state
actors and state responsibility: "The conduct of a person or group of
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of,
or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct."46 The degree of control exercised by a state has been a key
issue in a number of international cases. This includes the Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua case in the
International Court of Justice, which established that "effective
control" of non-state actors was needed to attribute state
responsibility to the actions of those organizations. Under "effective
control," for the United States to have responsibility for the
international violations of the contras in Nicaragua, it would have had
to have "directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to
human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State
[Nicaragua]."47 This contrasts with the standard of "overall control" in
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia case
Tadic.48 The Appeals Chamber in that case concluded each case
depends on the specific facts of a particular circumstance and that the
standard of "overall control" goes beyond financing and equipping
and includes "participation in the planning and supervision of military
operations."49
45 Article 4 states that the conduct of the organ of a state can be legislative, executive or
judicial, whatever its position or function in the central Government; Article 5 addresses
"conduct of persons or entit[ies] ... exercis[ing] elements of governmental authority";
Article 6 considers "conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State";
and Article 7 states that the conduct of an organ or person acting under governmental
authority may be attributed to the state, even if that organ or individual is "exceed[ing] its
authorities or [contravening] instructions." Id., ch. II, cmt. 8, at 39.
46 Id., art. 8, at 47.
47 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64 (June 27).
48 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 121 (July 15, 1999).
49 Tadic, 145. The Tadic standard is a lower threshold to cross than the Nicaragua
standard, although the actions of the United States in attributing responsibility for the
actions of al Qaeda to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is still a different threshold. The
United States argued that the Taliban was complicit in al Qaeda's actions because it did not
prevent the organization from using Afghanistan as a planning and operations base. See
Jinks, supra note 43.
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Thus, the scope of the ILC Draft Articles is generally limited to
state-to-state issues, although it does allow for attributing state
responsibility for unlawful actions by non-state actors to the state.
However, there must be a demonstration of instruction, direction, or
control in order to attribute such conduct to the state. As is clarified in
the commentaries, the actions of a state-owned and controlled
corporation are generally not attributable to the state, unless the
entity is a "corporate veil" for illegal actions of the state.50 Therefore,
whether a state may assume responsibility for non-state conduct
depends greatly on the facts of each case and must be based on
whether the non-state group is instructed, directed, or controlled by
the state or any of its organs.
2. APPLICABILITY OF ILC DRAFT ARTICLES TO CYBER
In order for a state to be held responsible for a non-state group's
activities in cyberspace, based on the principles set forth in the ILC
Draft Articles, two criteria must be met. First, the action must be a
violation of a primary obligation of the state. Second, if a non-state
actor takes the action, the state must have either instructed, directed,
or controlled the group's action.
The ILC Draft Articles may accordingly be useful in holding a
nation responsible for malicious attack traffic that originated in or
merely transited its networks, but only in the unlikely case this could
be considered a violation of "primary obligation" of states. Using
another example, under the ILC Draft Articles, Estonia would have
had to establish that the activity breached a primary obligation of
Russia and that the actions were instructed, controlled, or directed by
an organ of the state.
While it is possible to imagine a situation in which malicious cyber
activity would constitute violations of primary obligations, what the
world has seen to date would not reach those thresholds. Therefore,
the other principles discussed below, and primarily the principle of
transboundary harm, might be more helpful in dealing with non-state
actors.
50 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note
38, art. 8, cmt. 6, at 48.
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3. THE CUSTOMARY NORM OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS
The customary norm of good neighborliness is also potentially
applicable to cyberspace. The custom is generally considered to be a
product of international environmental law, including the Trail
Smelter case discussed in detail below. The principle will be discussed
in a broader context, as it encompasses the tension between obligation
and sovereignty, both of which have considerable implications for
cyberspace. While the principle has grounding in some other
capacities, the principle is in essence a norm of international
environmental law.51 For international environmental law, good
neighborliness is considered a general principle that dictates that
states utilize their resources in a way that will not damage the
environment, particularly that of their neighbors. Additionally, if a
breach of the principle of good neighborliness is a breach of a primary
obligation and one applies this environmental principle to cyberspace,
the ILC DraftArticles may have more applicability in that context.
The principle of good neighborliness establishes that "no state is
entitled to use its land in a way that might infringe on the rights of
another nation."52 This norm is further solidified in Trail Smelter,
demonstrating that the presence of good neighborliness in both an
international arbitration and as a general principle adds extra weight
to state responsibility and liability to prevent unlawful or harmful
transboundary activity to negatively affect another state. The Trail
Smelter arbitration discussed below also helped to establish the
customary status of a principle of "good neighborliness" between
nations,53 which is further developed through its gradual adoption
reflected in other international instruments, including the Stockholm
Declaration.
Good neighborliness was addressed, for example, in the Co-
operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural
51 For good neighborliness in other contexts, see, for example, Treaty of Good-
Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, P.R.C.-Russ., July 24, 2001, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/tl5771.htm.
52 Mark S. Blodgett et al., A Primer on International Environmental Law: Sustainability
as a Principle ofInternational Law and Custom, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 15, 21 (2008).
53 Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 259, 265 (1992).
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Resources Shared by Two or More States (UNEP Draft Principles).54
The 1978 UNEP Draft Principles were written pursuant to a request by
the U.N. General Assembly and were released two years after the
Working Group began its examination of the topic. When the General
Assembly requested the review, it made clear that any results from the
Working Group would be considered only principles and not binding
international law.ss Principle 7 of the UNEP Draft Principles states:
Exchange of information, notification, consultations
and other forms of co-operation regarding shared
natural resources are carried out on the basis of the
principle of good faith and in the spirit of good
neighborliness and in such a way as to avoid any
unreasonable delays either in the forms of co-operation
or in carrying out development or conservation
projects.56
Although the UNEP Draft Principles, like the ILC Draft Articles, do
not create international law, they reaffirm good neighborliness and its
obligations as a rule of international law.s? While this norm clearly
applies to environmental issues, including conservation, it is possible
to apply the same concepts and intentions of the UNEP Draft
Principles to cyberspace.
An additional aspect of good neighborliness is the "duty to
cooperate in investigating, identifying, and avoiding environmental
harm."58 Further, this norm can incorporate the exchange of general
54 U.N. Eny't Program, Governing Council Approval of the Report of the Intergovernmental
Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States: Co-
operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or
More States, U.N. Doc. GC.6/CRP.2, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1091 (1978) [hereinafter UNEP
Draft Principles].
55 PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 43-44 (2d ed.
2003).
56 UNEP Draft Principles, supra note 54, at lo99.
57 Additionally, while good neighborliness is a foundational customary principle in
international environmental law, scholars emphasize that it is not a jus cogens norm, nor
could it ever reach that status. See Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests,
Jus Cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for
Peremptory Norms, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 101 (1998).
58 Max Valverde Soto, General Principles ofInternational Environmental Law, 3 ILSAJ.
INT'L & COMP. L. 193, 197 (1996).
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information and prior notification.59 While prior notification should
be provided when possible, a state should also notify relevant states of
an emergency or event that will have transboundary effects. 60 While
good neighborliness does not require that a state consulting with
other states be bound by their opinions, consultation and notification
are crucial aspects of good neighborliness.
The scope of this norm may be limited in that it applies to
responsibilities owed by states to states, but the activity in question
need not be the action of a state. Rather, this norm requires that a
state notify and consult whenever activities within its boundaries will
have a negative impact on the territories or environment of another
state. Consider, for instance, the obligations of the Soviet Union to
notify states of the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl as the event was
happening and to pay damages later.6 1 However, the Chernobyl
accident also illustrates the limitation of recovering damages and
enforcing decisions.62 In terms of enforcing this rule, it seems as if the
norm has limited applicability because of its position as a general
principle-there is simply relatively little to build up scope and
enforceability.
A state's remedial options for a violation of good neighborliness
are the same as for other disputes, including the traditional levers of
59 Id. at 198; see also U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876, 879 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
60 Soto, supra note 58, at 198-99; Rio Declaration, supra note 59, at 879.
61 See Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law
Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 203, 207 n. 43 (1987).
62 As Malone states, "potential and actual litigants soon discovered that although the Soviet
Union was certainly responsible for damage from the accident under international law
recovery was uncertain and enforcement virtually impossible." Id. at 207. It was difficult
for victims of Chernobyl to receive benefits from the Soviet Union after the disaster, an
issue that continues, particularly regarding long-term health care and benefits from the
Government of Russia. See, e.g., Mareike Aden, The Legacy of Chernobyl Continues to
Shape Victims'Lives, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 25, 2011), http://wkwx-.dw-world.de/
dw/article/o,,15028249,oo.html; Alastair Fee, Chernoby1 Victims Struggle with
Consequences of Radiation Exposure, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 24, 2008,
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/o4/24/chernobyl-ictims-struggle-
with-consequences-of-radiation-exposure; Press Release, Int'l Atomic Energy Agency,
Chernobyl: The True Scale of the Accident (Sept. 5, 2005),
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2005/prn200512.html.
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statecraft and perhaps the International Court of Justice if the
consequences are sufficiently severe. However, it is the particulars of
the case that dictate the applicability of these international norms.
This is why it is important for states to clarify expectations when
applying these norms to cyberspace. If one considers botnets as a kind
of transboundary emission or significant form of transboundary harm,
the complaining state must be able to demonstrate damage in
violation of the principle of good neighborliness. Therefore, it is not an
issue of demonstrating that such botnets exist, but rather the extent of
damage caused by them. This, once again, demonstrates the need to
have a spectrum of state responsibility so that the issue of technical
attribution does not sidetrack states. The principle of good
neighborliness demonstrates that while harm must be demonstrated,
identifying the exact user of the computer controlling a command and
control server is not necessary when extending the metaphor to
cyberspace. The complexities of technical attribution need not
therefore delay the pursuit of a remedy. Rather, a state must request
through traditional political and diplomatic channels that the state
address the issue of transboundary harm emanating from its territory.
4. APPLICATION OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS TO CYBER
As applied to cyberspace, the principle of good neighborliness
would dictate that a state has an obligation to limit the negative
impacts of actors in its territory from negatively affecting the territory
or interests of another state. Using the language in the UNEP Draft
Principles, the "shared natural resources" in question can be the
interconnected networks of cyberspace because something in one
country's networks can easily and quickly have negative consequences
in the networks of other states. To that extent, using the principle of
good neighborliness, a state should exchange information, notify
others of potential issues, and consult with other states on malicious
activity in cyberspace. The goal of such information sharing and
obligations would be to improve cooperation against combating
clearly malicious activities, including botnets, DDoS attacks, and other
mechanisms that cause havoc in cyberspace. Such an obligation in
environmental law is expanded upon in Trail Smelter, which provides




C. THE FINDING OF STATE LIABILITY IN TRAIL SMELTER
The Trail Smelter arbitration case is a foundational environmental
case, but also has broad implications beyond international
environmental law. The case has implications for state sovereignty
and sets a key precedent in delineating the responsibilities of states for
incidents that cause transboundary harm, even if a non-state actor
causes such harm.63 In the Trail Smelter arbitration case, the United
States and Canada entered into arbitration to resolve a dispute about
sulfur dioxide emissions from a Canadian smelting plant that were
traveling over the border into U.S. jurisdiction. In order to avoid
polluting the area directly surrounding the plant and to accommodate
increased production, the Canadian smelter company had built a 409-
foot smokestack in 1925, which in turn sent the plant's fumes "higher
into the wind stream and therefore further down the valley."64 The
fumes were thus causing increased pollution in Washington state,
leading farmers to complain of "irreparable damage" to their crops,
grazing lands, and orchards. 65 The ensuing dispute lasted over fifteen
years, with the first Tribunal held in 1937. The 1941 final report
attributed responsibility to the smelting company and to Canada,
which voluntarily took on the liability in this circumstance. 66
While the actors in the initial dispute were private actors, the
arbitration shifted the matter into a public settlement between two
states. In its final report, the Trail Smelter Tribunal concluded:
[U]nder the principles of international law ... no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
63 Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty's Continuing Importance: Traces of Trail Smelter in the
International Law Governing Hazardous Waste Transport, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 181 (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
64 James R. Allum, "An Outcrop of Hell": History, Environment, and the Politics of the
Trail Smelter Dispute, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM
THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 13, 15 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds.,
2006).
65 Id.
66 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941).
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the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence. 67
The above statement is often cited as an important declaration of state
responsibility for transboundary environmental harm. Still, the
statement includes a number of caveats and limits to the range of state
responsibility involved. First, the holding in this report refers to
responsibility for a specific incident for which cause and effect were
readily identifiable. Responsibility for general environmental damage
with diffuse causes is not discussed. Second, state responsibility
applies when "the case is of serious consequence," and only when
there is manifest injury "established by clear and convincing
evidence." 68 These are important limitations to the scope of state
responsibility. Although the arbitration was not binding, it established
certain state obligations for transboundary harm and the principle
further elucidated in Trail Smelter has developed into customary law
that has crystallized over the ensuing decades.69 Additionally, Trail
Smelter adds weight to the norm of good neighborliness discussed
above.
1. APPLYING TRAIL SMELTER TO CYBER
According to the findings of the Tribunal, the principle of Trail
Smelter would seem to apply to the cyber equivalent of transboundary
harm if it were of "serious consequence" and "established by clear and
convincing evidence." Still, what constitutes "serious consequence"
can be difficult to ascertain and is particular to the circumstances of a
specific incident. However, it seems clear that the cyber attacks
against Estonia would exemplify a case of "serious consequence"
because the majority of banking, e-commerce, government, and media
67 Id. at 1965.
68 Id.
69 Legal scholars also note that despite the impressive reputation of the Tribunal decision,
the procedure of the case has never been repeated. Although the procedure and the format
of the decision places caveats on the scope of the decision, the Trail Smelter arbitration and
the subsequent history still clearly establishes customary international law regarding state
responsibility and liability. See John H. Knox, The Flawed Trail Smelter Procedure: The
Wrong Tribunal, the Wrong Parties, and the Wrong Law, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 66 (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
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websites and services were forced offline for weeks in a country
heavily dependent on e-services for all sectors of society.
Even absent such a massive attack, it is likely that "serious
consequence" could still be found. Botnets are responsible for millions
of dollars in damages through theft of personal information, sending
spam, and DDoS attacks. A nation may clearly have a claim against
another nation that continually allowed botnets to operate from its
territory.
The requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" need not be
insurmountable. While the ultimate author of an attack, such as
against Estonia, may not be known (or provable), the geographic
location of particular botnet computers and their automated
controllers is generally well understood. Trail Smelter establishes
state responsibility for actions of private actors in a single nation that
nonetheless have international implications. Many computer network
attacks and computer network exploitation schemes take just this
form.
The burden on a target state to establish another state's
responsibility might be greater if it were alleged that the defendant
state had instigated or supported an attack, as opposed to being
insufficiently vigilant in preventing activity or passively allowing
activities that the defendant state had an obligation to prevent. In this
case, Trail Smelter would be less useful than one of the other norms
listed in this article.
Trail Smelter is also helpful in determining the role of
compensation once transboundary harm has occurred. The "polluter
pays" principle outlines when the polluter bears the responsibility for
paying for any prevention and cleanup measures, as well as any
damages.70 However, as one scholar points out, the private company
in Trail Smelter was not a party to the arbitration. A more accurate
statement of the principle would seem to be the "polluter's nation
pays."7' In other words, for compensation and liability to be imposed
based on principles established through good neighborliness and Trail
Smelter, which are also solidified in the ILC Draft Articles, there must
be direct responsibility of the state.72 At the same time, using the
70 Mark Anderson, Derivative Versus Direct Liability as a Basis for State Liability for
Transboundary Harms, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM
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proposed "spectrum of state responsibility,"73 a state could still be
considered responsible for a large range of malicious cyber activity
using the international environmental norms discussed, but would
potentially not have to pay damages for the harm inflicted by either
the state or a non-state actor within its jurisdiction.
D. PRINCIPLE 21 OF THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION
State liability and responsibility in international environmental policy
became further entrenched with the first environmental conference in
Sweden in 1972.74 This conference, the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, produced the Stockholm Declaration.7s The
most relevant principle within the Stockholm Declaration is Principle
21:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law,
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.76
This text is a codification of the custom established in the Trail
Smelter arbitration and is considered by some to be the "progeny" of
the Trail Smelter decision.77 While the Stockholm Declaration is an
73 See Jason Healey, Beyond Attribution: A Vocabulary for National Responsibility for
Cyber Attacks, 18 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. (forthcoming 2011).
74 The Stockholm Conference was not the first environmental conference, nor was the
Stockholm Declaration the first international treaty. Earlier environmental conferences
include the 1968 African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
and the 1971 Ramsar Treaty. LOUKA, supra note 42, at 30.
7sU.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference in the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
76 Id. at Principle 21.
77 Stephen C. McCaffrey, Of Paradoxes, Precedents, and Progeny: The Trail Smelter
Arbitration 65 Years Later, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS
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important step forward in international environmental law, Principle
21 does not provide additional clarity as to the exact scope of state
responsibility. The balancing of sovereign rights and the responsibility
to other states has created much debate even in the wake of the
Stockholm Declaration and is also reflected in the continuing dialogue
about the role of the state and sovereignty in cyberspace.
Principle 21 is generally a state-to-state obligation, but it does
further establish state responsibility for the actions of non-state actors
using state territory or resources. The state's obligation to "ensure that
activities within [a State's] jurisdiction or control" do not damage the
environment of others implicates an obligation regardless of the
actor's responsibility for the initial activities.78 The state, therefore,
has the obligation to effectively govern and regulate its own resources.
While still a state-level obligation, this also addresses obligations for
non-state activities. Still, the consequences of a violation of the
Stockholm Declaration are limited. The Stockholm Declaration is not
binding upon states, although some articles are seen as codification of
customary international law. Because of the nature of the Stockholm
Declaration, it has limited enforcement, although it can be cited as a
clear articulation of an international norm should a state authorize,
passively permit, or fail to stop its territory from being used in a
manner contrary to the rights of other states.
In referring, however, both to states' "sovereign right to exploit
their own resources" and their "responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states," Principle 21 seems to give equal weight
to both concepts of sovereignty and international obligation in the
context of environmental protection.79 The tension in Principle 21 is
also found in Trail Smelter, although it is a further codification of the
rights and obligations of a state.
1. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE 21 TO CYBER
As applied to cyberspace, the "sovereign right to exploit their own
resources,"8 o may permit certain rights within a nation's networks;
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 34, 41 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller
eds., 2006).
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however, once those internal actions affect networks outside of a
state's networks and cyberspace, the state may have an obligation to
ensure that such activity does not cause significant damage to the
networks and users of the broader Internet. This can include DDoS
attacks or the use of botnets.
Using the example of Estonia, applying the norms behind
Principle 21 would require that if Russia-or indeed any other
country-was aware of non-state actors using its networks to "herd"
botnets or launch DDoS attacks, it would have an obligation to
prevent that "transboundary harm" or "damage" afflicting Estonia. If
the DDoS attacks were primarily targeting and affecting domestic
websites and services, Russia would not have this obligation.
However, once the attacks targeted external networks, sites, and
services, under Principle 21, Russia would have had at least a political
obligation to address and mitigate these attacks once they reached a
certain level of scope, severity, and intensity, similar to the Pictet
factors discussed above. Determining whether the circumstance
reaches those thresholds will depend on the specific facts, as do all
major incidents or controversies in international law and
international politics. Therefore, applying Principle 21 to cyberspace,
while needing political endorsement, would not be significantly
different than other issues in the international system.
While a potentially fruitful avenue to pursue, the analogy is not
without its difficulties. Networks are not obviously "natural
resources," as stated in Principle 21, though a convincing case might
be made that they should be treated "as if' they were. Additionally,
while jurisdiction and sovereignty are manifested differently in
cyberspace, these two concepts still apply and may actually prove
problematic for an open cyberspace. If the zone of sovereignty
embodied in the first half of Principle 21 applies to cyberspace, it
could be invoked to further justify harsh Internet censorship, counter
to key U.S. and Western values of free speech and freedom on
information.
E. THE IMPOSITION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN CORFU CHANNEL
Lastly, Corfu Channel establishes state responsibility for an
omission of an action. While the facts of the case are not about
environmental damage, the norm established is relevant for
transboundary harm and damage to the territory and jurisdiction of
another state. This case concerns two incidents in 1946 when an
international court held Albania responsible for mines in its waters,
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two of which damaged British destroyers.81 Even though Albania
objected that it had not placed the mines in the Strait, the Court
decided that Albania had the responsibility to notify other states of the
minefield and to warn the British ships of the imminent danger to
which the minefield exposed them.82 The Court held:
[Albania's obligations are based] ... on certain general
and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in
peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of
maritime communication; and every State's obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other States.83
Although not an environmental law case per se, Corfu Channel is
important because its holding has been repeated in pollution and
hazardous activities cases involving activities within one state that
have adverse affects on other states, creating, for example, the duty to
notify of pollution.84 Simply put, Corfu Channel establishes that if a
state knows or should have known about an activity, it has an
obligation to either mitigate the consequences or, if possible, notify
the other state before the activity occurs.
This norm is a state-to-state obligation, but again it determines
that a state can be responsible for "knowingly [allowing] its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." The
enforceability of this norm is dependent on the way in which a
"victim" state would address the violation. If the case was significant
enough to reach the International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel is a
firm statement of a state's obligation to other states. Because the norm
is not enshrined in treaty law, there is no obvious enforcement
mechanism, but states may pursue remedies as they would for other
violations of international law and custom. This issue of remedy and
enforceability is not unique to applying Corfu Channel to cyberspace.
8 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
82 LouKA, supra note 42, at 39.
83 Corfu Channel, supra note 81, at 22 (emphasis added).
84 LOUKA, supra note 42.The ILC Draft Articles also cite Corfu Channel as an example of
when an omission of the state can still invoke that state's responsibility to prevent the
breach of the primary obligation. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 38, ch. IV, cmt. 4, at 64.
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In fact, it is this issue of enforceability and remedy that may be the
most important for using these norms and principles in an
international political context rather than an international legal
context.
Generally, the norm further established in Corfu Channel requires
that when states are aware of activities that will impede the rights of
other states, the initial state has the obligation to prevent the
activities.
1. APPLICATION OF CORFU CHANNEL TO CYBER
As applied to cyberspace and the Estonian incident, if Russia was
aware that actors in its territory were responsible for the attacks
against Estonia, it would have had an obligation to prevent those acts.
Again, it is a question of thresholds and whether such activity rises to
the level of damage in both the Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel cases.
However, in the case of Estonia, in which many sectors were crippled
for weeks on end, it seems the attacks could be characterized as
transboundary harm. Because the attacks against Estonia did not rise
to the level for the application of the laws of armed conflict, it may be
more applicable to use norms developed in international
environmental law in cases such as Estonia to curtail similar incidents
and address the diplomatic implications should similar incidents
occur.
Similarly, for many years the United States has been one of the
main sources of malicious software and botnets. It is conceivable that
the Corfu Channel decision might be used against the United States
government, which seems to be obligated to prevent these attacks
when they impede the rights of other states.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Although the judgments and agreements discussed above often
arose in the context of environmental protection, they engage the
tension more generally between state sovereignty and a state's
obligations to others. This friction is apparent in inter-state relations
and non-state actors' activities in cyberspace. While it is not always
easy to identify and stop "cyber pollution," it is possible to both stop
malicious activity (once it is identified as such) and to disable botnets
and sources of malicious software. Recent takedowns of the Rustock
and Waledac botnets show how international coordination between
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states and non-states can effectively stop malicious activities.85 And
although these were addressed through a criminal approach, they are
examples of how environmental norms may be useful to motivate and
shame complicit or passive states into stopping malicious activity in
cyberspace. At the very least, a state intentionally ignoring non-state
actors who are causing damage to other states should be held
accountable, especially when one considers the precedent set in Corfu
Channel.
Overall, the international environmental legal framework can be
useful in attributing state responsibility and liability for computer
network attacks against another state. The application of key norms in
international environmental law can push forward development of
international law in cyberspace because it takes away some of the
"newness" of the problem. Certainly, there will be aspects of
cyberspace that will require different kinds of norms and new
regulations and expectations for state behavior. However, there are
times where existing frameworks with strong legal roots can
contextualize problems, making them less daunting. As Dupuy and
Hoss conclude, "The existence of an appropriate legal regime to deal
with such issues ... puts into question the many and varied attempts
to create new laws to deal with new problems." 86 While cyber-specific
international law may be lacking, the international legal regime can
provide guidance, as many of the "new" cyber issues are actually
similar to those in the "kinetic" world. Accordingly, a return to
foundational principles of international law can improve the
governance and regulations of cyberspace.
Key international environmental norms are applicable to the
actions of states and non-state actors in cyberspace because
transboundary harms in cyberspace pose analogous problems of
balancing sovereignty and international obligation. These norms may
be able to resolve the tension between sovereignty and obligations to
8 See Posting of Richard Boscovich to Microsoft on the Issues blog, Taking Down Botnets:
Microsoft and the Rustock Botnet, http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft on the issues/
archiv e/2011/o3/18/taking-down-botnets-microsoft-and-the-rustock-botnet.aspx (Mar.
17, 2011, 6:36 PM); Posting of Tim Cranton to Microsoft on the Issues blog, What We Know
(and Learned) from the Takedown of the Waledac Botnet, http://blogs.technet.com/
b/microsoft on the issues/archiv e/2010/o3/16/what-we-know-and-learned-from-the-
takedown-of-the-waledac-botnet.aspx (Mar. 16, 2010, 11:51 AM).
86 Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Cristina Hoss, Trail Smelter and Terrorism: International
Mechanisms to Combat Transboundary Harm, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 225, 239 (Rebecca
M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
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other international actors. The problems of cyberspace are large in
number and in complexity. However, other international legal
problems have been vast and complicated and have still been
addressed by international law with success. The complexity of a
problem should not necessarily preclude the application of
international law, nor should it require a completely new international
legal framework.
The scope of international environmental legal norms is helpful in
addressing a range of activities that cover state responsibility for the
actions of private actors within a state's jurisdiction that have
significant impact upon the territory of another state. As applied to
cyberspace, this could develop into a norm in which states are
obligated to ensure that the networks under their jurisdiction are not
used contrary to the rights of other states, including an obligation to
combat of DDoS, botnets, and other clearly malicious activity. Again,
this is not an issue of policing content, but rather of preventing the
most indefensible, malicious developments in cyberspace. The
enforceability of these norms is difficult, but not in any manner
significantly different than other issues in international law. Similarly,
the issue of remedy is limited based on enforceability and states must
rely on the traditional tools of statecraft, diplomacy, and military force
when necessary to address violations of international law. While this
is not specific to cyber issues, it should in some way be reassuring as
these are the tools used in international politics and diplomacy and
they have been used for centuries.
Still, while these norms seem to have compatible applicability to
cyberspace, states remain the international actors who need to push
forward the dialogue on this issue and consent to be bound by these
norms in the sphere of cyberspace. International environmental
norms offer a constructive example of balancing sovereignty with due
diligence and obligations to other nations. States should therefore
continue engagement in international forums. Dialogue and the
discussion of definitional matters should ideally be established before
the international system sees either a further proliferation or increase
in severity of cyber attacks. While international law struggles with
creating frameworks preventatively, states should still commit
themselves to continued dialogue in order to reach consensus on
appropriate state and non-state behavior in cyberspace. It is this issue
that demonstrates the value in pursuing norms first as a political issue
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followed by a potential legal issue depending on the maturation of the
norm.87
International environmental law is an under-utilized framework
for addressing problems in cyberspace that do not fall under the
framework of armed conflict or are not strictly criminal in nature.
Because this makes up much of current cyber conflict, there is great
utility in deriving principles from international environmental law.
Other international law frameworks have been proposed for
cyberspace, but environmental legal norms may also provide solutions
to the current and emerging issues in cyber security, cyber conflict,
and cyber defense. State responsibility is a crucial underpinning for
international environmental law and can also serve as an important
foundation for future expected norms and behaviors within
cyberspace.
87 Examples of organizations that may be good frameworks for this dialogue include the
U.N. Group of Governmental Experts, Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), or G-20. Regionally, organizations like the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could provide
neutral frameworks for discussion on norms and cyber policy as well.
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